CHINAMacroReporter

'Strangling with an intent to kill.’

I began to have some hope of getting our act together with Mr. Biden. He worked to rebuild relations with allies who could join the U.S. in the competition. And he understood the need for America to strengthen itself for competition. Hence, the infrastructure, CHIPS, and other acts. But whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden, one thing nagged me beyond all the rest. Why is America strengthening our competitor? — In the instant case: Why is America giving our competitor advanced semiconductor resources to strengthen itself to compete against us?
by

Malcolm Riddell

|

CHINADebate

November 22, 2022
'Strangling with an intent to kill.’
Is it just me, or does Mr. Biden look a lot happier than Mr. Xi when they met on at the G20 in Bali?

‘Last month, a small U.S. federal agency released a regulatory filing that has gotten relatively little media attention—especially in the context of its immense global ramifications,’ writes Ravi Agrawal in ‘America’s Risky New China Policy.’

  • As you will see, it's a little astonishing that this wasn't front-page news with continual follow-ups.

‘A monumental shift in United States policy vis-à-vis China took place on October 7,’ writes Bert Hofman, formerly of the World Bank and now at National University Singapore.

  • ‘On that day, the US Commerce department released a 139 page document listing measures that effectively restrict China’s access to the most advanced semiconductors.’

‘This is a big step.’

  • ‘As CSIS, a US think tank wrote:  “In weaponizing its dominant chokepoint positions in the global semiconductor value chain, the United States is exercising technological and geopolitical power on an incredible scale.” ’

‘So the gloves are off.’

  • ‘In fact, the measures are unprecedented in peacetime in its breath and reach.’

Consider five of the several ramifications of these measures:

[.cmrred]1 | The immediate ramification[.cmrred] is for China’s semiconductor industry. CSIS’s Gregory Allen writes in his terrific analysis,  ‘Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI’:

  • ‘These actions…begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.’

If that isn’t dire enough, here’s a tweet where Jordan Schneider of the Rhodium Group remarked:

  • ‘ “This is what annihilation looks like: China’s semiconductor manufacturing industry was reduced to zero overnight. Complete collapse. No chance of survival.” ’

[.cmrred]2 | Another ramification[.cmrred] – and a warning – comes from Jon Bateman of the Carnegie Endowment in ‘Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China’:

  • ‘This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (like biotech, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic.’
  • ‘The U.S. president has committed to rapid decoupling, whatever the consequences.’

[.cmrred]3 | A third ramification[.cmrred] is a new clarity in Biden’s China policy. ‘The purpose of the new export controls on semiconductors is clear enough,’ writes Michael Schuman in ‘Why Biden’s Block on Chips to China Is a Big Deal’:

  • ‘To hobble China’s quest to catch up with the U.S. in crucial industries of the future.’

‘These controls mark a distinct shift in Washington’s approach to China.’

  • ‘On top of trying to outcompete China, which is the intent of the CHIPS Act recently passed to support the U.S. semiconductor sector, Washington is now purposely and openly working to hold back Chinese economic progress.’

[.cmrred]4 | A less likely but still[.cmrred] worth considering ramification is Taiwan. In June 2020, Graham Alison of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of ‘Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?’ wrote ‘Could Donald Trump’s War Against Huawei Trigger a Real War With China?’

  • In that essay he posited:

‘Let us imagine that the Trump administration actually implements the ban on all sales of advanced semiconductors and equipment to manufacture semiconductors to China.’

  • ‘Could Beijing decide to try to make Taiwan the solution to its advanced semiconductor problem?’

‘Is such a scenario likely? I think not.’

  • ‘I’m betting that U.S. declarations about an embargo on all semiconductors are more bark than bite.’  

Now two and a half years later Mr. Biden has bitten.

  • And the issue of China’s invading Taiwan to gain its fabs – however unlikely - is again on the table.

[.cmrred]5 | Here’s a fifth ramification[.cmrred], and it’s one you could call personal.

  • I accept that the U.S. is in a competition with China.

But for many years, I wondered, ‘When is America going to start competing?’

  • We have been such a feckless competitor that I was beginning to believe Mr. Xi’s recycled assertion: ‘The East is rising, the West is declining.’
  • Not declining from relative weakness but from our inability to get our act together.

My take on Mr. Trump’s administration inability to get its act together is summed up by AEI’s Derek Scissors who recently wrote:

  • ‘Trump’s China trade and economic policies started off promising, deteriorated pretty quickly, and ended up as completely terrible.’
  • My one quibble is with ‘promising.’ For my part, read ‘dumb.’

I began to have some hope of getting our act together with Mr. Biden.

  • He worked to rebuild relations with allies who could join the U.S. in the competition.
  • And he understood the need for America to strengthen itself for competition. Hence, the infrastructure, CHIPS, and other acts.

But whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden, one thing nagged me beyond all the rest.

  • Why is America strengthening our competitor?

In the instant case:

  • Why is America giving our competitor advanced semiconductor resources to strengthen itself to compete against us?

As Michael Schuman puts it so well in ‘Why Biden’s Block on Chips to China Is a Big Deal’

  • ‘Xi’s oft-repeated call for a world-class military is aimed at tipping East Asia’s balance of power in China’s favor, and he would be foolish to expect Washington to hand him the technology to help him reach his goal.’
  • ‘Economically as well, Xi’s industrial programs deploy huge state financial support with the clear goal of overtaking the U.S. in key technologies and pushing American companies out of the China market, and ultimately making them uncompetitive.’

‘Biden’s harsh controls are less surprising than Xi’s apparent assumption that the U.S. would blithely participate in bringing about its own economic doom.’

  • ‘More surprising, perhaps, is that Biden’s shift took so long.’
  • Amen

PART 1 | 'A DISTINCT SHIFT'

[.cmrh2]1 | ‘A distinct shift in Washington’s approach to China’[.cmrh2]

‘The purpose of the new export controls on semiconductors is clear enough,’ writes Michael Schuman in ‘Why Biden’s Block on Chips to China Is a Big Deal’:

  • ‘To hobble China’s quest to catch up with the U.S. in crucial industries of the future.’

‘These controls mark a distinct shift in Washington’s approach to China.’

  • ‘On top of trying to outcompete China, which is the intent of the CHIPS Act recently passed to support the U.S. semiconductor sector, Washington is now purposely and openly working to hold back Chinese economic progress.’

‘In Washington, the policy is seen as a rational response to heightened geopolitical threats, and the central role technology plays in them.’

  • ‘National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said in a speech in September that “we have to revisit the long-standing premise of maintaining ‘relative’ advantages over competitors” in which the U.S. “maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead.” ’
  • ‘But, he went on, “that is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies … we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” ’

More directly, ‘Gregory Allen, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, called the controls a “genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations” that heralds “a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.” ’

  • ‘Dan Wang of Gavekal Dragonomics also put it bluntly, describing in a report the controls as “a new China containment strategy.” ’

[.cmrh2]2 | ‘Biden showed Xi who’s boss’[.cmrh2]

‘President Joe Biden showed Xi who’s boss,’ continues Mr. Schuman.

  • ‘Biden demonstrated that the U.S. still possesses the fight—and the bite—to defend its primacy.’

‘Biden’s new policy reveals that the standard narrative of China’s unstoppable ascent and America’s inexorable decline is based on flawed assumptions.’

  • ‘The U.S. continues to hold tremendous economic and technological advantages over China, which, as Biden just signaled, Washington is becoming more willing to use against its Communist competitor.’
  • ‘Above all, Biden’s export-control measures are a ruthless expression of American clout—and an intentional reminder that, in many respects, America has it and China does not.’

‘The problem for Xi is that he picked a fight with a wealthier and technologically more advanced power well before his nation had attained the economic strength to wage it.’

[.cmrh2]3 | ‘Xi brought this reversal on himself.’[.cmrh2]

Here’s the subtitle of Mr. Schuman’s essay:

  • ‘The new U.S. export controls on semiconductor technology will hurt Chinese industries.’
  • ‘Xi Jinping has only himself to blame.’

The point: ‘Xi brought this reversal on himself.’

  • ‘His oft-repeated call for a world-class military is aimed at tipping East Asia’s balance of power in China’s favor, and he would be foolish to expect Washington to hand him the technology to help him reach his goal.’
  • ‘Economically as well, Xi’s industrial programs deploy huge state financial support with the clear goal of overtaking the U.S. in key technologies and pushing American companies out of the China market, and ultimately making them uncompetitive.’

‘Biden’s harsh controls are less surprising than Xi’s apparent assumption that the U.S. would blithely participate in bringing about its own economic doom.’

  • ‘More surprising, perhaps, is that Biden’s shift took so long.’

PART 2: CONTROLLING THE CHOKEPOINTS

[.cmrh2]1 | ‘Four interlocking elements’[.cmrh2]

‘Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI’ is terrific analysis by CSIS’s Gregory Allen.

  • Here are a few excepts, but I encourage to read the full ten pages.

‘On October 7, the Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed,’

  • ‘With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over “chokepoint” (or, as it is sometimes translated from Chinese, “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain.

‘The most important chokepoints are:’

  • ‘AI chip designs,’
  • ‘electronic design automation software,’
  • ‘semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and’
  • 'equipment components.’

‘These are four interlocking elements of the new policy targeting different segments of the semiconductor value chain, and all elements must be understood simultaneously to grasp the scope of what the Biden administration plans on achieving.

[.cmrh2]2 | Four aims[.cmrh2]

‘In short, the Biden administration is trying to:’

1 | ‘Strangle the Chinese AI industry by choking off access to high-end AI chips.'

  • ‘The United States does not want China to have advanced AI computing and supercomputing facilities, so it has blocked them from purchasing the best AI chips, which are all American.’

2 | ‘Block China from designing AI chips domestically by choking off China’s access to U.S.-made chip design software.’

  • ‘The United States does not want China designing its own AI chips, so it has blocked China from using the best chip design software (which is all American) to design high-end chips.’

3 | ‘Block China from manufacturing advanced chips by choking off access to U.S.-built semiconductor manufacturing equipment.’

  • ‘The United States has blocked chip manufacturing facilities worldwide from accepting entity-listed Chinese chip design firms (as well as any Chinese chip company building high-end chips) as customers.’  

4 | ‘Block China from domestically producing semiconductor manufacturing equipment by choking off access to U.S.-built components.’

  • ‘The United States does not want China to have its own advanced chip manufacturing facilities, so it has blocked them from purchasing the necessary equipment, much of which is irreplaceably American.’

[.cmrh2]3 | ‘Strangling with an intent to kill’[.cmrh2]

The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints.’

  • ‘In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.’

PART 3 | TARGET TAIWAN?

[.cmrh2]1| 'More bark than bite'[.cmrh2]

In June 2020, Graham Alison of the Harvard Kennedy School and author of ‘Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?’ wrote ‘Could Donald Trump’s War Against Huawei Trigger a Real War With China?’

  • In that essay he posited:

‘Let us imagine that the Trump administration actually implements the ban on all sales of advanced semiconductors and equipment to manufacture semiconductors to China.’

  • ‘Could Beijing decide to try to make Taiwan the solution to its advanced semiconductor problem?’

‘Is such a scenario likely? I think not.’

  • ‘I’m betting that U.S. declarations about an embargo on all semiconductors are more bark than bite.’  

Now that two and a half years later Biden has bitten, the issue – however unlikely - of China’s invading Taiwan to gain its fabs is again on the table.

[.cmrh2]2 | Remember Huawei?[.cmrh2]

‘The centerpiece of the Trump administration’s “tech war” with China is the campaign to prevent its national champion Huawei from becoming the dominant supplier of 5G systems to the world.’

  • ‘After months of diplomatic efforts to dissuade other nations from buying their 5G infrastructure from Huawei, the administration delivered what one official called a “death blow.” ’

‘On May 15, the Commerce Department banned all sales of advanced semiconductors from American suppliers to Huawei.’

  • ‘It also prohibited all sales of equipment to design and produce advanced semiconductors by foreign companies that use U.S. technology or intellectual property.’

Now Mr. Biden has taken the next step of banning all advanced semiconductors.

  • Will this put Taiwan in even more in China's crosshairs?

[.cmrh2]3 | ‘The solution to China’s advanced semiconductor problem?’[.cmrh2]

‘Could the U.S. attempt to enforce that ban become a twenty-first-century equivalent of the oil embargo the United States imposed on Japan in August 1941?’

  • ‘To punish Japan for its military aggression against its neighbors in the late 1930s, the United States had initially imposed sanctions, and later an embargo on exports of high-grade scrap iron and aviation fuel to Japan.’
  • ‘When these failed to stop its expansion, Washington ratcheted up the pressure by including essential raw materials such as iron, brass, and copper.’
  • ‘Finally, on August 1, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the United States would embargo all oil shipments to Japan.’

‘Eighty percent of Japan’s oil came from the United States, and Japan’s military forces required that oil to operate at home as well as across the Greater Co-prosperity Area in Northeast Asia.’

  • ‘Facing what it saw as a choice between slow but sure strangulation, on the one hand, and taking an extreme chance that offered hope of survival, on the other, the government chose to take its chance with what it hoped would be a “knockout blow”—a bold preemptive attack aimed to destroy the U.S. Pacific Navy stationed at Pearl Harbor.’

‘As relations between the United States and China worsen over the months ahead [this is June 2022], could Beijing decide to try to make Taiwan the solution to its advanced semiconductor problem?’Now two and a half years later Dr. Alison’s ‘unlikely’ scenario of the U.S.’s cutting off China from advanced semiconductors has happened.

  • And the issue of China’s invading Taiwan to gain its fabs – however unlikely - is again on the table.

PART 4 | ‘LITTLE MEDIA ATTENTION.’ HUH?

Given the foregoing, our opening seems extraordinary:

  • ‘Last month, a small U.S. federal agency released a regulatory filing that has gotten relatively little media attention—especially in the context of its immense global ramifications.’
  • How could this not have been front-page news?

You may not have seen much about this policy shift and its implications in the press.

  • But going forward, be alert to new and similar policies that the media misses – they’re going to be ‘immense.’

More

CHINAMacroReporter

October 31, 2022
Xi's China: 'less reliable, less predictable, and less efficient'
‘China’s predictability is being eroded by the frequent, erratic policy shifts that have taken place in recent months, such as the unexpected disruptions to power supplies that took place in 2021, and the sudden mass lockdowns that were imposed in an attempt to contain COVID.'
keep reading
October 18, 2022
Xi Jinping: ‘Crossing a threshold to outright dictatorship?’'
The view from inside China appears to be quite different. Yes, the Chinese people may grumble about the Zero-COVID lockdowns, and just a few days a banner critical of Mr. Xi and his regime was unveiled over an overpass in Beijing.
keep reading
October 10, 2022
The 20th Party Congress with All Eyes are on Xi Jinping
The attention to Mr. Xi is in large part because he will exit the Party Congress with even greater power, no discernible opposition, and a new five-year term (with more likely to follow). And many of the constraints that may have been in place not to jeopardize his reappointment will be gone.
keep reading
November 22, 2022
'Strangling with an intent to kill.’
I began to have some hope of getting our act together with Mr. Biden. He worked to rebuild relations with allies who could join the U.S. in the competition. And he understood the need for America to strengthen itself for competition. Hence, the infrastructure, CHIPS, and other acts. But whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden, one thing nagged me beyond all the rest. Why is America strengthening our competitor? — In the instant case: Why is America giving our competitor advanced semiconductor resources to strengthen itself to compete against us?
keep reading
October 31, 2022
Xi's China: 'less reliable, less predictable, and less efficient'
‘China’s predictability is being eroded by the frequent, erratic policy shifts that have taken place in recent months, such as the unexpected disruptions to power supplies that took place in 2021, and the sudden mass lockdowns that were imposed in an attempt to contain COVID.'
keep reading
October 18, 2022
Xi Jinping: ‘Crossing a threshold to outright dictatorship?’'
The view from inside China appears to be quite different. Yes, the Chinese people may grumble about the Zero-COVID lockdowns, and just a few days a banner critical of Mr. Xi and his regime was unveiled over an overpass in Beijing.
keep reading
October 10, 2022
The 20th Party Congress with All Eyes are on Xi Jinping
The attention to Mr. Xi is in large part because he will exit the Party Congress with even greater power, no discernible opposition, and a new five-year term (with more likely to follow). And many of the constraints that may have been in place not to jeopardize his reappointment will be gone.
keep reading
September 26, 2022
China Coup: How Worried Should Xi Be?
‘Xi and the phrase #ChinaCoup trended on social media after tens of thousands of users spread unconfirmed rumors that the president was detained and overthrown by the China's People's Liberation Army.’
keep reading
September 18, 2022
'How do you spy on China?'
Many of you have asked about my own take on the issues I analyze in these pages and about my background. Today is some of both.I am honored to have been interviewed by the terrific Jeremy Goldkorn, editor-in-chief of The China Project. Below is part of that interview.
keep reading
September 5, 2022
Xi’s Dangerous Radical Secrecy
In a world of political hardball, investigative reporting, and tabloids, we know a lot (if not always accurate or unspun) about world leaders, especially those in functioning democracies. Not so with Xi Jinping.
keep reading
July 10, 2022
Building Biden's 'Great Wall' Around China
Whether you view it as an aggressive adversary or a nation asserting itself in ways commensurate with its rising status, China is creating risks – some subtle, some obvious - that, along with reactions of the U.S. and its allies, have to be factored, into every related business, investment, and policy strategy.
keep reading
July 1, 2022
A Debt Crisis of its Own Making
Ever since Xi Jinping announced ‘One Belt, One Road’ in 2013, I watched it expand China’s economic and geopolitical influence and lay the foundation for projecting its military power – and become by many accounts an exploiter of the developing world itself.
keep reading
June 22, 2022
No. Ukraine Won't Change Xi's Plans - or Timetable - for Taiwan
Ukraine won't speed up or delay Mr. Xi's timetable. (But it may cause him to work harder to strengthen China's military and insulate its economy from external pressure.)
keep reading
June 12, 2022
'The competitiveness of China is eroding.'
Understanding the drivers of China’s rise to supply chain prominence gives (me anyway) insights to help analyze the changes – or not – of ‘decoupling.’
keep reading
June 5, 2022
U.S.-China Relations: A Chinese Perspective
Wang Jisi notes that the views are his own, and certainly we don’t know how closely, if at all, they reflect the thinking of anyone in the leadership. But given his straightforward and thorough analysis, free of canned arguments and slogans, I hope they do. I also hope the Biden administration pays heed.
keep reading
May 30, 2022
Is Xi Jinping China's Biggest Problem?
And while the impact of Zero Covid may be relatively short-lived, the impact of Mr. Xi’s return to the socialist path will be felt for a very long time, both in China and the world. So the impact will no doubt be felt as long as Mr. Xi leads China.
keep reading
May 22, 2022
The Next U.S.-China Crisis: CEOs & Boards Are Not Ready
‘The bad news is that very few corporations engaged in China have contingency plans or long-term strategies to hedge against the downside risks of growing geopolitical competition.’
keep reading
May 14, 2022
China GDP: 'A very long period of Japan-style low growth.’
Here are some of the insights from ‘The Only Five Paths China’s Economy Can Follow’ by Peking University’s Michael Pettis. This excellent analysis of China’s economy is worth a careful reading.
keep reading
May 1, 2022
'Zero Covid' & the Shanghai lockdown
Joerg Wuttke is the president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China - the 'official voice of European business in China.'
keep reading
April 17, 2022
Is China's Tech 'Crackdown' Really Over?
Today, I’m sharing with you a bit of Ms. Schaefer’s analysis of the tech ‘crackdown’ (but not of the AI and algorithm law). She explains why...
keep reading
April 17, 2022
China: 'Sleep Walking into Sanctions?'
A looming risk is Russia-like sanctions on China. The sanctions on Russia are causing plenty of disruptions. But those disruptions would be nothing compared to the catastrophe of Russia-like sanctions on China. The good news is that if China does violate the sanctions, the violations would likely be narrow and specific - even unintentional. So secondary sanctions - if they come at all - likely won't hit China’s economy and financial system deeply – or (fingers crossed) U.S.-China relations.
keep reading
April 5, 2022
Russian Sanctions' Impact on China
In the meantime, some contend, China has a payment system, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System or CIPS, that could make it independent of SWIFT.
keep reading
March 21, 2022
Faint Cracks
For some time now we’ve taken it for granted that Xi Jinping has so consolidated his power that his will is China policy.
keep reading
March 13, 2022
Is China in a Bind?
It wants to support Russia, but also wants to support the international order from which benefits and doesn’t want to alienate the major economies its own economy is intertwined with.
keep reading
February 19, 2022
Under Construction: Two (Opposing) World Orders
Years ago, before the so-called ‘New Cold War,’ when asked what China issue interested me most, I said, ‘China and the liberal world order.’
keep reading
February 17, 2022
'A Fateful Error'
As the 1904 cartoon from Puck magazine shows, this isn’t the first time in the past 100 or so years that Russia has shattered the peace. [Or has been defeated, as it was in 1905 by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War.]
keep reading
February 2, 2022
Ukraine, Taiwan, & the 'Nightmare Scenario'
This in no way diminishes the calamity of a war with China. But the ability of the U.S. to wage that war would not be diminished by having to fight Russia at the same time.
keep reading
January 18, 2022
This is Mr. Xi's Big Year - and Nothing Better Spoil It
Every politician going into an election wants a strong economy. Xi Jinping is aiming to be reelected (and all indications are he will be) to a third five-year term at the National Party Congress this autumn. So Mr. Xi will ease (and stimulate ) as much as he can without creating major headaches to deal with after his reelection - all in the name of 'stability.'
keep reading
January 5, 2022
Bachelors, Mother-in-Laws, & China's Economy
‘In the long-term, demographics is one of the most important forces that will shape the growth momentum of China for the next decades. Two demographic features that are especially worth paying attention:’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 6 | China Reverse Its Declining Birthrate?
‘A lot of people feel like the ideal, the optimum number of children is a maximum of two children. So it's not a surprise to me that the three-child policy hasn’t had a high response in the short term. But I think in the long term it will be much better.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Shang-jin Wei Presentation-1 | Drivers of Growth Momentum
‘In the last year and a half we saw a spate of government actions all contributed to not just falling stock prices for companies in certain sectors but a deterioration in investor sentiment more broadly. These include:...’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 1 | How Much Does the Gender Imbalance Contribute to China’s Rising Housing Prices?
‘Gender imbalance accounts for about one-third of the increase in China’s housing prices in the last two decades or so.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 4 | Is China Exporting Inflation?
'‘China has its own issues. If you look at the CPI inflation, it looks more moderate. ‘If you look at the producer price inflation, it looks more severe.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 2 | Will the Gender Imbalance Keep Housing Prices Firm in the Medium Term?
‘The part of housing prices caused by gender-ratio imbalance is not going to go away in the medium term. But the government has ways to create volatility in the housing market.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 3 | Property 2022: Stabilization or Growth?
‘The goal is to stabilize housing prices while having housing sector grow.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Shang-jin Wei Presentation-3 | Analyzing the Gender Imbalance Data
‘Compare these with graph showing the impact of the same factors on rental prices...'
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Shang-jin Wei Presentation-2 | Gender Imbalance as a Driver of Housing Prices
‘Why does gender imbalance have such an outsize impact on China’s housing prices?'
keep reading

Heading

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Suspendisse varius enim in eros elementum tristique. Duis cursus, mi quis viverra ornare, eros dolor interdum nulla, ut commodo diam libero vitae erat. Aenean faucibus nibh et justo cursus id rutrum lorem imperdiet. Nunc ut sem vitae risus tristique posuere.