CHINAMacroReporter

‘Is Xi Coup-proof?’ (after the march on Moscow, I have to ask)

What about the guys without guns? So if Mr. Xi doesn’t face a rogue army or a military coup… How about a coup by Party elites?
by

Malcolm Riddell

|

CHINADebate

July 10, 2023
‘Is Xi Coup-proof?’ (after the march on Moscow, I have to ask)

On Saturday morning, June 24, a friend called and asked: ‘Have you seen the news?’

  • I said no, and he said, ‘Well, get on the TV.’

What I saw there was of course the Wagner Group marching on Moscow.

  • Then, the fizzle.

Can’t imagine that when Xi Jinping first heard of the Wagner Group’s march, he didn’t think:

  • Do I have any Prigozhins around me?

And no doubt just as fast as the question came into his head, so did the answer:

  • No.

Unlike Mr. Putin, Mr. Xi has absorbed the first principle for successful autocrats:

  • Don’t set up an independent army outside your control.
  • (That’s also a lesson from China’s Warlord Era a century ago that I cover in the last section - don't miss it, really interesting.)

Still, the march on Moscow was a surprise.

  • And this led me to look again at how likely such a surprise against Mr. Xi might be.

I had to ask:

  • Is Mr. Xi coup-proof?

1 | False alarm

The Wagner march reminded me that about a year ago, rumors abounded that Xi Jinping had fallen from a military coup. As Newsweek reported:

  • ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping became one of the top trending topics on Twitter amid unsubstantiated reports he is under house arrest and that China is in the midst of a military coup.’ 
  • ‘Xi and the phrase #ChinaCoup trended on social media after tens of thousands of users spread unconfirmed rumors that the president was detained and overthrown by the China's People's Liberation Army.’

Being without basis, this fizzled faster than the march on Moscow.

  • But the march also reminded me that Mr. Xi and other senior cadre have themselves reported concerns about ‘plots’ and ‘traitors.’

2 | Sic semper tyrannis

‘Plots to overthrow Xi and his administration are not the product of fevered imaginations but rather have been widely spoken of by senior Chinese officials, including Xi Jinping himself,’ wrote Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette in 2021.

  • ‘Many date back to the early months of 2012, underlining Xi’s belief that rivals wanted to prevent him from taking over leadership of the CCP later that year.’
  • ‘Others are vague and amorphous accusations of unnamed “plots” by anonymous “traitors” that are likely levelled to justify Xi’s shakeup of the party bureaucracy and his wide-reaching intra-party discipline campaigns.’

Real or justifications, an autocrat always has to watch his back.

  • As an expert, when commenting on President Biden’s calling Mr. Xi a dictator, wrote on a China forum:

‘Dictators for life probably have a hard time buying life insurance.’

  • ‘If they do not cultivate a successor and make it clear they’ll relinquish power gracefully, they’ll end up “eliminated with extreme prejudice” as the mob used to say.’
  • ‘I’m talking to you, PUTINHEAD, Emperor Xi, and fat guy in North Korea.’

Sic semper tyrannis.

3 | What keeps an autocrat up at night?

‘If you are an autocrat, who do you have to fear? Like, what keeps you up at night?'

‘In the popular imagination, what an autocrat has to fear is unrest.’

  • ‘He has to fear protestors in the street, storming the gates and taking him down.’

‘Generally though, what has led to the unconstitutional exit of authoritarian leaders from office isn't mass protest, isn't mass uprising.’

  • ‘Instead, it's coups; it's other elites taking down the leader. And that's really what autocrats have to worry about.’

'And who launches coups that are successful nine out of 10 times?’

  • ‘The military.’

‘So if you're an autocrat, what you really have to be nervous about is:’

  • ‘What's the military doing, and is the military coming after me?’

4 | Xi’s military-coup-proofing

‘You can't completely rule out a military coup against Xi,’ says Dr. Mattingly,

  • ‘with this caveat:’

‘I do think that Xi's done enough to make it really hard to launch a successful military coup against him,'

  • ‘Between promoting people who are loyal to him and promoting left-behind officers who aren't well connected to other civilian elites and other military elites, he's done enough on the military side to make it hard to get military buy-in for a coup to occur.'

‘And there are a number of other factors that push against it.'

  • ‘Number one is a real sense of unity and national force that Xi Jinping has effectively stoked by first painting the United States as a threat to China.'
  • ‘Number two is the rhetoric about the role of the Party as an important force in China's very revival.'
  • ‘Number three is Xi's laser focus on making sure the military is loyal.'

5 | ‘The guys with the guns’

Until a few years ago, I would have said that, like Xi’s regime, the American presidency was immune from a coup.

  • Now we know it can be touch & go.

In the ‘60s, I encountered ‘Seven Days in May,’ both as a novel and a movie.

  • The plot: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is thwarted from staging a coup to overthrow the President and take power.

In 2020, this played out, but sort of in reverse.

  • The plot: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vowed to thwart a defeated American president from using the U.S. military to stay in power.

Re 2020, Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker report in ‘I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year’:

  • ‘As Trump ceaselessly pushed false claims about the 2020 presidential election, Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, grew more and more nervous, telling aides he feared that the president and his acolytes might attempt to use the military to stay in office.’
  • ‘They're not going to F'ing succeed,’ Milley said. ‘You can't do this without the military. You can't do this without the CIA and the FBI.’
  • ‘We're the guys with the guns.’

That you can’t do it without the guys with the guns is something both Mao and Mr. Xi get:

  • Mao: ‘Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.’ Mao Zedong, Problems of War and Strategy, November 1938
  • Xi: ‘The party must command the gun…. We [will] enhance the political loyalty of the armed forces [and] strengthen them through the training of competent personnel.’ Xi Jinping, Speech on the CCP’s 100th Anniversary, July 2022

But there is one big difference here:

  • In the U.S., the guys with the guns swear allegiance to the American Constitution (thank you, General Milley).
  • In China, to the Chinese Communist Party.

6 | ‘The Party commands the gun.’

But it’s more than the Party controlling the PLA.

  • The PLA is charged with guaranteeing the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission.

  • To ensure Party control, the General Secretary of the CCP concurrently serves as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

‘Soon after coming to power, President Xi Jinping made sure that the PLA was firmly under the Party’s control by purging numerous generals,’ notes Oxford's Rana Mitter.

  • ‘As they follow coverage of Putin having to admit that a major Russian city was occupied by a rival army, the Chinese Politburo will have no doubts that their ruthlessness in military matters has paid off.’

7 | 'Proficiency in battle ranks fourth'

In ‘China’s military set-up is designed to foil any would-be Prigozhin,’ Charles Parton notes:

  • ‘The People’s Liberation Army is an explicitly political force — and the ultimate guarantor of the party’s hold on power.

‘The People’s Liberation Army is the Chinese Communist party’s army and not a national army.’

  • ‘ “Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party,” said Mao Zedong.’

‘Whatever Yevgeny Prigozhin was plotting in Russia last week — mutiny, insurrection, civil war — this level of military insurrection would never have been possible in China.’

  • ‘The idea that anyone outside the PLA and the People’s Armed Police might have the right to bear arms is anathema.’ 

‘Xi’s military reforms, listed in order of priority, consisted of:’

  1. ‘reinforcing ideological commitment to the party, ‘
  2. ‘recruiting and promoting the right people,’
  3. ‘the fight against corruption,’
  4. ‘proficiency in battle and political innovation.’

‘It is striking that the ability to fight wars ranked only in fourth place.’

  • ‘But this is no surprise, given that the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the party’s hold on power (in Russia, by contrast, it has traditionally been Putin’s security services, rather than the army, who fulfil this role).’

‘Even at times of chaos, such as during the Cultural Revolution, the PLA, while restoring order, has never acted against the party.’

  • ‘It acquiesced as Mao removed its leader Lin Biao, just as it did when Deng Xiaoping and Xi removed top generals.’

‘If there were to be a severe leadership split which led to economic meltdown, the PLA might align with one or other political faction.’

  • ‘But at present there is only one faction in China and it is Xi’s.’

8 | What about the guys without guns?

So if Mr. Xi doesn’t face a rogue army or a military coup…

  • How about a coup by Party elites?

In ‘After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era,’ Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette point out:

  • ‘It is true that Xi has a host of enemies in the party.’
  • But ‘the chances of a coup being mounted against Xi at the moment, absent a systemic crisis, are exceedingly small.’

‘It is equally true that the barriers to organising against him are near insurmountable.’

  • ‘Successfully organising a coup against an incumbent leader — especially one in a Leninist one-party state — is a daunting challenge.’

‘Given the technological capabilities of the CCP security services, which Xi controls, such an endeavour is fraught with the risk of detection and the possible defection from early plotters who change their mind.’

  • ‘Despite their enormous power, senior members of the CCP and the PLA lack the basic ability to move about and communicate unnoticed by Xi’s all-seeing security apparatus.’
  • ‘Xi’s increasing grip over domestic security services means that the communication between would-be challengers necessary for arranging logistical details would be next to impossible.’

9 | Afterword: ‘The Return of the Warlords’

If he didn’t get that lesson not to permit independent armies from the handbook for autocrats, Mr. Xi would have learned the lesson from Chinese history. As Oxford’s Rana Mitter notes in ‘The Return of the Warlords’:

  • ‘A hundred years ago, it was China, not Russia, that was split by “warlords” and weakened by chronic conflict between their private armies.'

In 1911, a revolution overthrew China’s last dynasty, the Ching.

  • And a republic was formed but didn’t last long.

‘China’s brief republican experiment was quickly overcome by a contest between military groups.’

  • ‘China was divided into regions ruled by local armies.
  • ‘The term “warlord” (junfa) was used pejoratively to describe their commanders.’

‘The effects of divided authority were obvious and grim.’

  • ‘No one ruler could lay claim to all of China, and military leaders were constantly forming alliances that fell apart amid internecine fighting.

This map gives an idea of the regions and the changes in territory during China’s Warlord Era. (Sorry for the poor quality, but it makes the point in general.)


‘Patriotic activists lamented that the danger confronting China had become twofold:

  • ‘imperialism from outside, warlordism from inside.’

‘In 1928, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek established a government that nominally unified China.’

  • ‘Yet he spent much of the next ten years fighting rival military leaders as well as the Communists (forcing the latter on the famous Long March in 1934).’

‘In 1937, war broke out with Japan, and in some cases, warlords cut their own deals with the invaders, seeking to preserve their regional power.’ 

‘Once the Communists had won the Civil War in 1949, Mao moved to crush all possible alternative sources of power in China.’

  • ‘The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was established as the Party’s army, not the national army. That is still its status today.

‘The collective memory of the warlord period is one reason why China’s leaders are determined to keep military force firmly under the ruling Communist Party’s control.’

Hence, Mr. Xi isn’t in danger of a rogue army marching on Beijing.

  • Because there are no rogue armies in China.

And unlike the Russian army, the PLA stands loyally poised to fight any threat to Mr. Xi and the Party.

More

CHINAMacroReporter

August 24, 2023
Xi Jinping: 'The East is Rising' | Yes. Rising against China
All our careful analyses of PLA capabilities, the parsing of Mr. Xi’s and Mr. Biden’s statements, the predictions as to the year of the invasion, everything – all out the window. This is one you won’t see coming – but one you have to have prepared for.
keep reading
July 23, 2023
‘The U.S. Has Tactics, But No China Strategy’ | Bill Zarit
‘The U.S. needs national review of outward investment to China, but it has to be narrow and targeted and done in conjunction with our allies and partners.’
keep reading
April 2, 2023
Xi Jinping: 'Change unseen for a 100 years is coming.'
Time went of joint in the mid-1800s when China began its ‘Century of Humiliation.’ And Mr. Xi, with a sense of destiny, seems to feel he was born to set it right. (I very much doubt that Mr. Xi would add: ‘O cursed spite’ – he seems to relish his role and the shot it gives him to go down in history as China’s greatest ruler.)
keep reading
August 24, 2023
Xi Jinping: 'The East is Rising' | Yes. Rising against China
All our careful analyses of PLA capabilities, the parsing of Mr. Xi’s and Mr. Biden’s statements, the predictions as to the year of the invasion, everything – all out the window. This is one you won’t see coming – but one you have to have prepared for.
keep reading
July 23, 2023
‘The U.S. Has Tactics, But No China Strategy’ | Bill Zarit
‘The U.S. needs national review of outward investment to China, but it has to be narrow and targeted and done in conjunction with our allies and partners.’
keep reading
July 10, 2023
‘Is Xi Coup-proof?’ (after the march on Moscow, I have to ask)
What about the guys without guns? So if Mr. Xi doesn’t face a rogue army or a military coup… How about a coup by Party elites?
keep reading
April 2, 2023
Xi Jinping: 'Change unseen for a 100 years is coming.'
Time went of joint in the mid-1800s when China began its ‘Century of Humiliation.’ And Mr. Xi, with a sense of destiny, seems to feel he was born to set it right. (I very much doubt that Mr. Xi would add: ‘O cursed spite’ – he seems to relish his role and the shot it gives him to go down in history as China’s greatest ruler.)
keep reading
January 2, 2023
Xi Jinping: Bad Emperor?
Some have asked me what will be the greatest risk to China in the next five years. My answer: That Xi Jinping will overstep and enact policies that Chinese people won’t accept, especially those that have a direct impact on their lives and livelihoods.
keep reading
November 22, 2022
'Strangling with an intent to kill.’
I began to have some hope of getting our act together with Mr. Biden. He worked to rebuild relations with allies who could join the U.S. in the competition. And he understood the need for America to strengthen itself for competition. Hence, the infrastructure, CHIPS, and other acts. But whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden, one thing nagged me beyond all the rest. Why is America strengthening our competitor? — In the instant case: Why is America giving our competitor advanced semiconductor resources to strengthen itself to compete against us?
keep reading
October 31, 2022
Xi's China: 'less reliable, less predictable, and less efficient'
‘China’s predictability is being eroded by the frequent, erratic policy shifts that have taken place in recent months, such as the unexpected disruptions to power supplies that took place in 2021, and the sudden mass lockdowns that were imposed in an attempt to contain COVID.'
keep reading
October 18, 2022
Xi Jinping: ‘Crossing a threshold to outright dictatorship?’'
The view from inside China appears to be quite different. Yes, the Chinese people may grumble about the Zero-COVID lockdowns, and just a few days a banner critical of Mr. Xi and his regime was unveiled over an overpass in Beijing.
keep reading
October 10, 2022
The 20th Party Congress with All Eyes are on Xi Jinping
The attention to Mr. Xi is in large part because he will exit the Party Congress with even greater power, no discernible opposition, and a new five-year term (with more likely to follow). And many of the constraints that may have been in place not to jeopardize his reappointment will be gone.
keep reading
September 26, 2022
China Coup: How Worried Should Xi Be?
‘Xi and the phrase #ChinaCoup trended on social media after tens of thousands of users spread unconfirmed rumors that the president was detained and overthrown by the China's People's Liberation Army.’
keep reading
September 18, 2022
'How do you spy on China?'
Many of you have asked about my own take on the issues I analyze in these pages and about my background. Today is some of both.I am honored to have been interviewed by the terrific Jeremy Goldkorn, editor-in-chief of The China Project. Below is part of that interview.
keep reading
September 5, 2022
Xi’s Dangerous Radical Secrecy
In a world of political hardball, investigative reporting, and tabloids, we know a lot (if not always accurate or unspun) about world leaders, especially those in functioning democracies. Not so with Xi Jinping.
keep reading
July 10, 2022
Building Biden's 'Great Wall' Around China
Whether you view it as an aggressive adversary or a nation asserting itself in ways commensurate with its rising status, China is creating risks – some subtle, some obvious - that, along with reactions of the U.S. and its allies, have to be factored, into every related business, investment, and policy strategy.
keep reading
July 1, 2022
A Debt Crisis of its Own Making
Ever since Xi Jinping announced ‘One Belt, One Road’ in 2013, I watched it expand China’s economic and geopolitical influence and lay the foundation for projecting its military power – and become by many accounts an exploiter of the developing world itself.
keep reading
June 22, 2022
No. Ukraine Won't Change Xi's Plans - or Timetable - for Taiwan
Ukraine won't speed up or delay Mr. Xi's timetable. (But it may cause him to work harder to strengthen China's military and insulate its economy from external pressure.)
keep reading
June 12, 2022
'The competitiveness of China is eroding.'
Understanding the drivers of China’s rise to supply chain prominence gives (me anyway) insights to help analyze the changes – or not – of ‘decoupling.’
keep reading
June 5, 2022
U.S.-China Relations: A Chinese Perspective
Wang Jisi notes that the views are his own, and certainly we don’t know how closely, if at all, they reflect the thinking of anyone in the leadership. But given his straightforward and thorough analysis, free of canned arguments and slogans, I hope they do. I also hope the Biden administration pays heed.
keep reading
May 30, 2022
Is Xi Jinping China's Biggest Problem?
And while the impact of Zero Covid may be relatively short-lived, the impact of Mr. Xi’s return to the socialist path will be felt for a very long time, both in China and the world. So the impact will no doubt be felt as long as Mr. Xi leads China.
keep reading
May 22, 2022
The Next U.S.-China Crisis: CEOs & Boards Are Not Ready
‘The bad news is that very few corporations engaged in China have contingency plans or long-term strategies to hedge against the downside risks of growing geopolitical competition.’
keep reading
May 14, 2022
China GDP: 'A very long period of Japan-style low growth.’
Here are some of the insights from ‘The Only Five Paths China’s Economy Can Follow’ by Peking University’s Michael Pettis. This excellent analysis of China’s economy is worth a careful reading.
keep reading
May 1, 2022
'Zero Covid' & the Shanghai lockdown
Joerg Wuttke is the president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China - the 'official voice of European business in China.'
keep reading
April 17, 2022
Is China's Tech 'Crackdown' Really Over?
Today, I’m sharing with you a bit of Ms. Schaefer’s analysis of the tech ‘crackdown’ (but not of the AI and algorithm law). She explains why...
keep reading
April 17, 2022
China: 'Sleep Walking into Sanctions?'
A looming risk is Russia-like sanctions on China. The sanctions on Russia are causing plenty of disruptions. But those disruptions would be nothing compared to the catastrophe of Russia-like sanctions on China. The good news is that if China does violate the sanctions, the violations would likely be narrow and specific - even unintentional. So secondary sanctions - if they come at all - likely won't hit China’s economy and financial system deeply – or (fingers crossed) U.S.-China relations.
keep reading
April 5, 2022
Russian Sanctions' Impact on China
In the meantime, some contend, China has a payment system, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System or CIPS, that could make it independent of SWIFT.
keep reading
March 21, 2022
Faint Cracks
For some time now we’ve taken it for granted that Xi Jinping has so consolidated his power that his will is China policy.
keep reading
March 13, 2022
Is China in a Bind?
It wants to support Russia, but also wants to support the international order from which benefits and doesn’t want to alienate the major economies its own economy is intertwined with.
keep reading
February 19, 2022
Under Construction: Two (Opposing) World Orders
Years ago, before the so-called ‘New Cold War,’ when asked what China issue interested me most, I said, ‘China and the liberal world order.’
keep reading
February 17, 2022
'A Fateful Error'
As the 1904 cartoon from Puck magazine shows, this isn’t the first time in the past 100 or so years that Russia has shattered the peace. [Or has been defeated, as it was in 1905 by the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War.]
keep reading
February 2, 2022
Ukraine, Taiwan, & the 'Nightmare Scenario'
This in no way diminishes the calamity of a war with China. But the ability of the U.S. to wage that war would not be diminished by having to fight Russia at the same time.
keep reading
January 18, 2022
This is Mr. Xi's Big Year - and Nothing Better Spoil It
Every politician going into an election wants a strong economy. Xi Jinping is aiming to be reelected (and all indications are he will be) to a third five-year term at the National Party Congress this autumn. So Mr. Xi will ease (and stimulate ) as much as he can without creating major headaches to deal with after his reelection - all in the name of 'stability.'
keep reading
January 5, 2022
Bachelors, Mother-in-Laws, & China's Economy
‘In the long-term, demographics is one of the most important forces that will shape the growth momentum of China for the next decades. Two demographic features that are especially worth paying attention:’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 6 | China Reverse Its Declining Birthrate?
‘A lot of people feel like the ideal, the optimum number of children is a maximum of two children. So it's not a surprise to me that the three-child policy hasn’t had a high response in the short term. But I think in the long term it will be much better.’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Shang-jin Wei Presentation-1 | Drivers of Growth Momentum
‘In the last year and a half we saw a spate of government actions all contributed to not just falling stock prices for companies in certain sectors but a deterioration in investor sentiment more broadly. These include:...’
keep reading
December 30, 2021
Q&A 1 | How Much Does the Gender Imbalance Contribute to China’s Rising Housing Prices?
‘Gender imbalance accounts for about one-third of the increase in China’s housing prices in the last two decades or so.’
keep reading

Heading

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Suspendisse varius enim in eros elementum tristique. Duis cursus, mi quis viverra ornare, eros dolor interdum nulla, ut commodo diam libero vitae erat. Aenean faucibus nibh et justo cursus id rutrum lorem imperdiet. Nunc ut sem vitae risus tristique posuere.