Biden China Tracker

'From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening democratic cooperation for today's challenges'
'From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening democratic cooperation for today's challenges'
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G7 to D10

3

June 9, 2021
BIG IDEA | ‘A “Democratic-10” or “D-10” is aimed at rallying the world’s most powerful democracies around a common cause— advancing a rules-based democratic order based on shared values and common interests.’

‘With the rules-based democratic order under threat, leading democracies need to develop common strategic approaches that pool their collective influence to confront today’s challenges.’

  • ‘While the concept of a “D-10”—aimed at fostering strategic alignment and coordinated action among a group of like-minded, influential democracies to advance a rules-based democratic order was developed more than a decade ago, it has recently risen to the top of the global agenda and has garnered widespread interest.’

‘The United Kingdom signaled its support for the D-10 construct in May 2020, as a club of democracies initially focused on fifth-generation (5G) technology coordination.’

  • ‘Last fall, Prime Minister Johnson extended invitations to the leaders of Australia, India, and South Korea, with the apparent intention to expand the G7 into a new D-10.’
  • ‘However, these plans were scaled back when certain governments, including Japan, Germany, France, and Italy, reportedly expressed concerns about reshaping the G7.’
  • ‘Still, the UK has moved forward with plans to bring together the three additional countries, as well as South Africa, as “guests” at the G7 Summit, and the group will reportedly issue a new “Open Societies Charter” reflecting support for common principles.’

‘To succeed in this new era of strategic competition, leading democracies need to leverage their collective capabilities and influence to defend against autocratic challengers.’

  • ‘Stronger coordination among nations that share common values and interests is key to an effectively managed global order.’
  • ‘To this end, a new D-10 can serve to foster strategic alignment and coordinated action among a group of like-minded, influential democracies to advance a rules-based democratic order.’

‘The D-10 would provide a standing framework for consultation at the strategic level, facilitating collaboration on the most important challenges facing the global order.’

  • ‘It can serve to drive a common approach to counter the wide range of autocratic threats posed by Russia and China. It can forge a technology initiative to develop common norms, standards, and resilient supply chains for advanced technologies.’
  • ‘It can provide a channel for rebuilding democratic commitments to free and fair trade, and a new climate initiative to collectively advance green technologies.’
  • ‘A D-10 can organize collective strategies to counter authoritarianism and advance democratic governance.’
  • ‘And it can facilitate a common approach to nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea, and coordinate defense strategies and military investments across the free world.’

‘More broadly, the D-10 could focus on facilitating a consensus on strategic priorities and longer-term objectives, and better ways to align resources, allocate responsibilities, and address gaps in collective capabilities among D-10 states.’

  • ‘It could also serve as a core group for broader coalitions of nations on specific issues, and as a consultative platform to quietly align positions and shape agendas in other multilateral venues, including the UN.’

‘The benefits of a D-10 are threefold.’

  1. ‘First, it would provide a mechanism for strategic coordination among leading democracies across the globe. In addition to serving as a consultative body, it would provide an impetus for joint decision-making and coordinated action to address today’s challenges.’
  2. ‘Second, it would reinforce the virtues of democratic solidarity, making clear to friends and foes alike the democratic world is united in its determination to uphold a rules-based democratic order.’
  3. ‘Finally, it would serve as a signal to domestic audiences, highlighting the need to stand together with democratic allies and partners to defend shared values and advance common interests.’

‘The D-10 is not intended as a security alliance or an alternative to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, nor is it directed at confronting or containing China or any other nation.’

  • ‘Rather, it is aimed at rallying the world’s most powerful democracies around a common cause— advancing a rules-based democratic order based on shared values and common interests.’
  • ‘The overarching strategic challenge facing the United States and other democracies is whether they can preserve a rules-based democratic order that reflects these values, or “whether the world will slip back toward a state in which illiberal regimes and coercive practices are ascendant.” ’

Read the full 30-page proposal.

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